Art and Ethics (II)

The philosophy of “to do” and ethics today finds themselves in very different situations. The first one does not have a need to manifest the existence of a productive activity of man, while one must justify a moral activity distinct from productive activity and independent of it. Such a justification can only be done in light of the final cause, and we know how difficult it is for us to truly grasp the final cause.

Let us immediately note that one must not confuse the philosophical point of view, with the actual fact of human activity capable of realizing this or that work of art and the problem of the origin of this activity: how did it appear, and why? To satisfy needs? Is it the first human activity, or does it always suppose a preceding one? The problem of origin is certainly captivating, but it is not what we want to study here. Moreover, to truly know this it is necessary to know the nature of the productive activity. Is it possible to seek the origin of something if we ignore its nature? In the same way, from the philosophical point of view one must not confuse more or less certain hypotheses, and the very existence of the reality. Up until what point can man develop his power, his capacity to transform the universe? Up until what point can he exercise his dominum? Will he be able, following the ambitions of Nietzche, to make a more perfect universe, one that is more marvelous than the first one, the universe of the superman which will make people forget about the one of the Creator? Such questions are obviously very seductive, and to try to respond to them would be even more so! But, the philosopher of reality is not a prophet. He seeks to grasp what is within the power of man, this capacity to transform the world, and in doing so he wants to show the limits and the grandeur of the productive activity of man. In order to make precise unto what point this aptitude of man to transform the world can extend itself, one must know what this capacity is. The problem of the origin than makes us look toward the past, the problem of what lies ahead projects us into the future, presupposing the problem of actual reality, the only one that we can philosophically know.